To verify whether a transferable utility game is exact, one has to check a linear inequality for each exact balanced collection of coalitions. This paper studies the structure and properties of the class of exact balanced collections. Comparing the definition of exact balanced collections with the definition of balanced collections, the weight vector of a balanced collection must be positive whereas the weight vector for an exact balanced collection may contain one negative weight. We investigate minimal exact balanced collections, and show that only these collections are needed to obtain exactness. The relation between minimality of an exact balanced collection and uniqueness of the corresponding weight vector is analyzed. We show how the class of minimal exact balanced collections can be partitioned into three basic types each of which can be systematically generated.
Introduction
One of the most important notions in cooperative game theory is the core. Introduced by Gillies (1953) , the core consists of all allocations that are both individually and coalitionally stable. Given an allocation in the core of the game, no coalition has an incentive to split off. There exist games for which such an allocation does not exist, resulting in an empty core. Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) showed independently that non-emptiness of the core is equivalent with balancedness.
A collection of coalitions is balanced if one can find positive weights for all coalitions in the collection such that every player is present in coalitions with total weight exactly equal to one. A game is balanced if for all such collections and all such weights, the weighted sum of the values of the coalitions does not exceed the value of the grand coalition. An interpretation is that the players can distribute one unit of working time among all coalitions in such a way that for every coalition, all members are active for an amount of time equal to the coalition's weight, and in doing so the players cannot create more value than by working one unit of time in the grand coalition.
The concept of balanced collections has played a major role in the literature on the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) , the prenucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) , and weighted nucleoli (Derks and Haller, 1999) . In particular, it is an important part of the Kohlberg condition (Kohlberg, 1971) , which is used to check if a given imputation is the nucleolus of a given game. Furthermore, balanced collections are strong tools in proofs on properties and characterizations as is seen in e.g., Derks and Haller (1999) .
To verify that the core of a game is non-empty, not all balanced collections are needed. A balanced collection of coalitions is minimal, if there does not exist a proper subset that is also balanced. As it turns out, only minimal balanced collections have to be considered to ensure non-emptiness of the core. This greatly reduces the number of constraints to be checked for nonemptiness of the core. Furthermore, the class of minimal balanced collections is sharp, in the sense that there exists no subclass of the class of minimal balanced collections that ensures balancedness of the game.
A game is exact (Schmeidler, 1972) if for every coalition, there exists a core element that allocates precisely the value of the coalition to its members. Therefore in such a core element, the coalition gets exactly its stand alone value. Many important applications of cooperative game theory have led to the study of exact games. Classes of games such as e.g., convex games (Shapley, 1971) , risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty (Csóka et al., 2009) , convex multi-choice games (Branzei et al., 2009) and multi-issue allocation games (Calleja et al., 2005) are exact. Exactness turns out to be equivalent with exact balancedness as introduced in Csóka et al. (2011) . Exact balancedness is similar to the notion of balancedness, when we allow one of the weights to be negative.
Regarding exact balancedness, many exact balanced collections are redundant when verifying the exactness of a game. We show that only minimal exact balanced collections are essential to obtain exactness. However, it is not possible to use the same approach as 0165 with minimal balanced collections. This is due to the fact that while the set of balanced weight vectors is a convex set in which the extreme points are the weight vectors corresponding with minimal balanced collections, the set of exact balanced weight vectors is not a convex set.
We show that the class of minimal exact balanced collections can be partitioned into three types. The first type consists of all minimal balanced sets. The second type, the class of minimal subbalanced collections, is formed by all minimal balanced collections for every proper subgame, to which two coalitions are added: the grand coalition of the subgame, and the grand coalition of the original game. The last type, the class of minimal negative balanced collections, consists of all other minimal exact balanced collections for which every weight vector has one negative weight.
One of the main results concerns the special structure of the class of minimal negative balanced collections. We show that every minimal negative balanced collection can be obtained from a minimal balanced collection by replacing one coalition, with a weight strictly smaller than one, by its complement. Moreover, for every minimal negative balanced collection there exists exactly one such combination of a minimal balanced collection and a coalition with a weight strictly smaller than one.
The class of minimal exact balanced collections ensures exactness of the game, but the class can be reduced even further. We show that only the class of minimal subbalanced collections and the class of minimal negative balanced collections are needed to guarantee exactness. So, the class of minimal balanced collections is redundant.
With respect to the uniqueness of the weights, it is well known that the class of minimal balanced collections coincides with the set of balanced collections for which the set of balanced weight vectors consists of one point. A similar result can be obtained for minimal exact balanced collections. If the exact balanced weight vector is unique for a certain exact balanced collection, then this collection is minimal exact balanced. The other way around is not true in a strict sense. For two types, minimal balanced and minimal negative balanced collections, the corresponding weight vector is unique. For every minimal subbalanced collection however, there exists more than one exact balanced weight vector but all weight vectors are related to each other by a linear transformation, and induce the same constraint on the game.
In the process, we also see how we can systematically and efficiently generate all minimal exact balanced collections, by adapting the inductive approach to construct all minimal balanced collections by Peleg (1965) .
Just as balanced collections are not only used to verify the nonemptiness of the core, but also in characterizing the pre-nucleolus useful in several results on (variations of) the nucleolus, these insights in the theoretical structure of exact balanced collections provide a wider range of techniques to obtain further results on these solution concepts.
The paper is organized as follows: the subsequent section introduces some notions regarding cooperative game theory, and repeats the main results regarding balanced collections. Section 3 contains the definitions of several notions regarding exact balancedness, and includes the results on the uniqueness of the weights. Section 4 shows that the class of minimal exact balanced collections can be partitioned into three easily identifiable types. Section 5 states that minimal exact balanced collections are sufficient to ensure exactness of the game. Section 6 describes the construction of minimal exact balanced collections.
Balancedness
First, we introduce some basic notions regarding cooperative game theory and balancedness. Given a finite player set N, a 
To check for non-emptiness of the core, one can use the notion of balancedness. Take β ∈ Λ + such that β {1} = β {2} = 1 and β S = 0 for S ∈ N \ {{1}, {2}}, and take γ ∈ Λ + such that γ {1,2} = 1 and
Now, for a vector β ∈ R N , we define the set
 of transferable utility games for which the weighted sum of the values of the coalitions with respect to β is less than or equal to the worth of the grand coalition. Also, we define V
is the set of games that satisfy the constraints imposed by all balanced weight vectors for collection B, and V + is the set of games that satisfy the constraints imposed by all balanced weight vectors. 
We find that the balanced collection B = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} corresponds with more than one balanced weight vector, for instance β = ( ) and γ = ( ). We have that
Theorem 2.4 (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) .
It is well known that not all balanced collections are necessary to guarantee that a game is balanced. Minimal balanced collections suffice to characterize the class of games with a non-empty core. Theorem 2.6 (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967 
Not only do we need just the minimal balanced collections to characterize the non-emptiness of the core, an additional advantage of minimal balanced collections is that for every minimal balanced collection there exists only one balanced vector of weights. For the following theorem, we provide the proof by Peleg and Sudhölter (2003) as we will use a similar technique later on to prove results on minimal exact balanced collections.
Theorem 2.7 (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967 Proof (Peleg and Sudhölter, 2003) .
First we show that a balanced collection that is not minimal corresponds to more than one balanced weight vector. If C B is a balanced collection with weights γ ∈ Λ + (C), then it is readily verified that aγ + (1 − a)β ∈ Λ + (B) for a ∈ [0, 1), so the weight vector for B is not unique.
Second, we show that every collection with more than one balanced weight vector is not minimal. Assume that there exists another weight vector α ∈ Λ(B), α ̸ = β. As there exists a coalition S ∈ B such that β S > α S , we obtain that a = min{
N and B is not minimal.
The following theorem states that we cannot characterize the set of balanced games by a subset of the minimal balanced collections.
Theorem 2.8 (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) 
Exact balancedness
Games with a non-empty core can be characterized using balanced collections. A similar characterization exists for exact games. Exact games form a subclass of the class of games with a non-empty core.
Definition 3.1. A game v ∈ TU N is exact if for every coalition
Schmeidler (1972) provides a characterization of exact games. Csóka et al. (2011) introduces two different characterizations of exact games, one using total balancedness and overbalancedness, and one using exact balancedness. For a discussion on these three characterizations we refer to Csóka et al. (2011) . Here, we use exact balancedness as defined by Csóka et al. (2011) except that in line with Definition 2.1 we exclude the trivial collection {N}.
Definition 3.2 (Csóka et al., 2011) .
We denote Λ(E) for the set of all exact balanced vectors on E . A collection E ⊆ N is called exact balanced if Λ(E) ̸ = ∅. Denote E N for the set of all exact balanced collections on player set N, and Λ = ∪ E ∈E N Λ(E).
In the remainder, we will typically use E and D to denote exact balanced collections, and use λ and δ to denote their respective weight vectors.
Note the discrepancy with the definition of balanced vectors. For exact balanced weight vectors, we allow for one negative weight. As Csóka et al. (2011) argues, the negative weight in an exact balanced collection can be interpreted as players in the coalition with a negative weight working overtime in other coalitions, and paying the opportunity cost of doing so to the coalition that is active for a negative amount of time. It is readily checked that Λ + (E) ⊆ Λ(E) for every E ⊆ N , and therefore
In contrast with Λ + , Λ is not a convex set in general, since a convex combination of two elements of Λ is not necessarily an element of Λ.
Clearly, λ and δ are exact balanced weight vectors. However, the convex combination 1 2 (λ + δ) is not an exact balanced weight vector, as it has two negative components. This means that Λ is not a convex set.
Define, similar to the definitions of V
class of games that satisfy the constraint imposed by weight vector λ, V (E) is the set of all games that satisfy the constraints imposed by the exact balanced weight vectors of the collection E and V is the class of exact balanced games.
Theorem 3.4 (Csóka et al., 2011) . A game v ∈ TU N is exact if and
So, just as balancedness is equivalent with non-emptiness of the core we have that exact balancedness is equivalent with the existence for every coalition of a core element where this coalition gets precisely its stand-alone value. Similar to the definition of minimal balanced collections, we define minimal exact balanced collections. Table 1 .
If the size of the player set increases, the number of collections in the different classes grows considerably. Table 2 shows the number of collections in all classes for up to 4 players. The minimal balanced collections as well as the minimal exact balanced Table 1 Minimal balanced and minimal exact balanced collections for N = {1, 2, 3}. collections are generated using methods introduced later on in this paper.
As we have shown in Theorem 2.7, the class of minimal balanced collections coincides with the set of balanced collections with a unique weight vector. For minimal exact balanced collections, a somewhat weaker statement holds: the class of minimal exact balanced collections not containing the grand coalition coincides with the set of exact balanced collections with a unique weight vector. Proof. We prove the 'only if' part of the theorem by showing that we can construct an exact balanced subcollection of E if the weight vector is not unique. Take E ∈ E N min with N ̸ ∈ E . Suppose that there exist two weight vectors λ, µ ∈ Λ(E) such that λ ̸ = µ.
If both λ ∈ Λ + (E) and µ ∈ Λ + (E), we have by Theorem 2.7 that E ̸ ∈ B N min . Hence, there exists an exact balanced subcollection of E in this case.
Next assume E ∈ B N min , λ ∈ Λ + (E) and µ ̸ ∈ Λ + (E). Let U ∈ E be such that µ U < 0, and take a = min{
. Note that 0 < a < 1 since λ S > 0 and µ S > 0 for all S ∈ E \ {U}, and a ≥ 1 would imply that
where the strict inequality uses that µ U < 0 < λ U . Note that β S = 1 1−a (λ S − aµ S ) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ E , with equality for at least one coalition. If we take B = {S ∈ E | β S > 0}, then B is a proper subset of E and
Finally, let λ ̸ ∈ Λ + (E) and µ ̸ ∈ Λ + (E). This means that there exist coalitions T ∈ E and U ∈ E such that λ T < 0 and µ U < 0.
Assume T = U. Take a = min{
Note that a > 0 since for S ∈ E either both λ S > 0 and µ S > 0 or both λ S < 0 and µ S < 0. It holds that a < 1, as a ≥ 1 would imply that either To prove the 'if' part of the theorem, let E ⊆ N be such that Λ(E) = {λ} for some λ ∈ R N . First suppose E ̸ ∈ E N min . We show that we can construct a second weight vector in Λ(E). As E ̸ ∈ E N min , there exists an exact balanced subcollection D E .
Take µ ∈ Λ(D) and define the function f :
As f is continuous, there exists an ϵ > 0 such that the sign of f S (ϵ) coincides with the sign of λ S for all S ∈ E .
Secondly, suppose N ∈ E . It is readily checked that λ N ≤ 1, and if λ N < 1 we obtain that the collection A = E \ {N} is exact balanced with weight vector µ S =
we have that
Define the weight vector µ by µ S = 2λ S for all S ∈ E \ {N}, µ N = 1 and µ S = 0 otherwise. It is readily checked that µ ∈ Λ(E) with µ ̸ = λ, a contradiction.
There exist minimal exact balanced collections with more than one exact balanced weight vector. By Theorem 3.7 such a collection must contain the set N.
Example 3.8. Take N = {1, 2, 3}. The collection E = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}, N} is minimal exact balanced, but there exists more than one weight vector: define λ by λ {1} = λ {2} = 1, λ {1,2} = −1 and λ N = 1 and µ by µ {1} = µ {2} = 2, µ {1,2} = −2 and µ N = 1. It is readily checked that λ ∈ Λ(E) and µ ∈ Λ(E).
If a minimal exact balanced collection does contain the grand coalition, then there exists more than one exact balanced weight vector, but these weight vectors are related in a special way and induce the same constraint on the game. Furthermore, if for an exact balanced collection all weight vectors induce the same constraint on the game, then the collection is minimal exact balanced.
Theorem 3.9. Let E ∈ E N . Then E ∈ E N min and N ∈ E if and only if for every λ ∈ Λ(E) and µ ∈ Λ(E) there exists a scalar a > 0 such
Proof. For the 'only if' part of the proof, let E ∈ E N min be such that N ∈ E . Let λ ∈ Λ(E). It is readily checked that λ N ≤ 1, and if λ N < 1 we obtain that the collection C = E \ {N} is exact balanced with weight vector γ S = λ S 1−λ N for every S ∈ C. Hence, λ N = 1. Take T ∈ E such that λ T < 0. Such an T ∈ E exists, as N ∈ E and therefore E ̸ ∈ B N min . As  S∈E \{N} λ S e S = 0 and λ S > 0 for all S ∈ E \ {T }, we obtain that S T for all S ∈ E \ {T , N}.
This implies that the location of the negative weight is unique, 
This implies that
T min for small ϵ > 0. So, λ T β S + λ S = 0 and therefore λ S = −λ T β S for every S ∈ E \ {N, T }. Now take µ ∈ Λ(E) and take a = µ T λ T . Since µ T < 0 and λ T < 0, a > 0. We have µ T = aλ T by definition, and µ S = −µ T β S = −aλ T β S = λ S for every S ∈ E \ {N, T }.
For the 'if' part of the proof, clearly N ∈ E . Suppose E ̸ ∈ E N min .
As E is not minimal, there exists a D
Let λ ∈ Λ(E) and δ ∈ Λ(D). Define µ = (1 − b)λ + bδ, where b > 0 is sufficiently small, such that the sign of δ S equals the sign of µ S for every S ∈ E . Clearly, µ ∈ Λ(E). 
Partitioning the class of minimal exact balanced collections
In this section we study the structure of the class of minimal exact balanced collections. It turns out that this set can be decomposed in three parts, all related to balanced collections. The first part consists of all minimal balanced collections. Proof. Let B ∈ B N min . It is clear that every minimal balanced collection is also exact balanced. It remains to show that it is also minimal exact balanced. Assume there exists an exact balanced collection E B and take λ ∈ Λ(E). We will show that this results in a contradiction with B ∈ B N min .
Since B ∈ B N min we know that there exists a T ∈ E such that λ T < 0 as B does not have a proper subset that is balanced. Take a = min{ 
So, indeed λ ∈ Λ(E).
By definition of B
N min and the observation that N ̸ ∈ B for every B ∈ B N min , we have N ̸ ∈ E for every E ∈ B N min . Hence, for this second part of the partition we can focus on collections without the grand coalition. Consider such a collection which is not minimal balanced. Then it is minimal exact balanced if and only if it is negative balanced. This also implies that the exact balanced weight vector of Theorem 4.3 is in fact the unique exact balanced weight vector.
Theorem 4.4. We obtain α S > 0 for all S ∈ A \{U} and α U ̸ = 0. Furthermore, for i ∈ U:
Proof of (i). Let
So, α ∈ Λ(A) and therefore A ∈ E N . As A B this contradicts our assumption of B ∈ E N min .
(ii) Assume λ 
Furthermore, take C = {S ∈ E | γ S ̸ = 0}. By definition of β, we obtain γ N\U = 0 and γ S > 0 for all S ∈ C \ {T }. So, C B and γ ∈ Λ(C) so we obtain a contradiction with the minimality of B.
So, we have
Furthermore, for i ∈ N \ T :
and for i ∈ T it holds that  S∈B,S∋i First suppose there exists a β
Then we obtain by definition of
a contraction with the minimality of E . Next suppose that for every minimal balanced collection C B
N and therefore
This contradicts the minimality of E , since we can take δ S = β C S for every S ∈ D and δ T = −1, and we have (1 − ϵ)β + ϵδ ∈ Λ(E) for small ϵ > 0.
The third part of the partition consists of the minimal subbalanced collections. These collections consist of all minimal balanced collections of a subgame, to which the grand coalition of both the subgame and the original game are added.
as the set of all minimal subbalanced collections. For every minimal subbalanced collection, we can relate the weight vector of the underlying minimal balanced collection of a subgame to an exact balanced weight vector. For all coalitions in the balanced collection, the weight in the exact balanced weight vector is equal to the weight in the underlying balanced weight vector. The weight on the grand coalition of the subgame equals −1 in the exact balanced weight vector, and lastly the weight on the grand coalition in the original game equals 1. 
Proof. It is readily checked that
The following theorem shows that every minimal subbalanced collection is minimal exact balanced. Also, every minimal exact balanced collection that contains the grand coalition is a minimal subbalanced collection. This also means that the weight vector of Theorem 4.5 coincides with the standardized weight vector as introduced in Section 3. Theorem 4.6. Proof of (ii). By Theorem 3.9 we have λ 
Sufficient conditions for exactness
As mentioned before, the class of minimal balanced collections is useful as one does not need other balanced collections to check whether a game is balanced. The class of minimal exact balanced weights exhibits the same feature: the following theorem shows that we only need the minimal exact balanced collections to check whether a game is exact.
Then Theorems 2.6 and 4.1 imply that v ∈ V (δ).
Note that v ∈ V (δ) is directly implied by v ∈ V (γ ). Hence, in the remainder we will assume that U ̸ = N.
We first show that a ≤ 1. Suppose on the contrary that a > 1. As δ S > λ
If we can find an
We discriminate between two subcases:
= e U .
• a < 1. We define
It is now easily seen that
Note that K ∈ E N and κ ∈ Λ(K), as κ S > 0 for all S ∈ K \ {U}, κ U < 0, and
Case 2: λ
The equivalent of Theorem 2.8 for minimal exact balanced collections however does not hold, as there exist minimal exact balanced collections that are redundant. The following example illustrates this. 
The question arises which minimal exact balanced collections we can discard. It turns out that for |N| ≥ 3,
V . So, we can omit all the minimal balanced conditions. To show this, we first introduce a lemma to construct particular members of E N min .
Lemma 5.3. Let |N| ≥ 3 and take S ∈ N and T ∈ N such that S ∩ T = ∅.
Proof of (i). The collection {S ∪ {i}, T , N \ {i}} is minimal balanced with weight vector λ such that λ S∪{i} = λ T = λ N\{i} = 
We show that for every partition B with |B| ≥ 3 there exists a partition C such that |C| < |B| and ∩ E ∈E We have shown that for verifying that a game is exact, the class of minimal balanced collections is redundant. However, as the following example demonstrates, there exists an even smaller subclass of the class of minimal exact balanced collections that still ensures exactness of the game. Further research on the topic could possibly establish a characterization of a subclass of minimal exact balanced collections that is sharp, in the sense that no collection can be left out while still guaranteeing exactness.
On the construction of minimal exact balanced collections
Using Theorem 2.6, it can be checked if a game is balanced utilizing minimal balanced collections only. However, the efficiency of this approach depends on the construction of these collections. Peleg (1965) provides an efficient and comprehensive algorithm for obtaining all minimal balanced collections. Given a player set and the corresponding class of minimal balanced collections, the algorithm constructs from every minimal balanced collection a number of candidate collections for a player set with one player extra. By checking a number of basic conditions on the candidate collection and the weight vector of the collection on the smaller player set, it is readily checked if the candidate is indeed minimal.
This procedure can be extended to efficiently check for exactness of a game. As we derived an explicit relation between minimal balanced collections on the one hand and minimal negative balanced collections and minimal subbalanced collections on the other hand, the collections and their respective weight vectors can be constructed from the minimal balanced collections. Theorems 4.4 and 4.6 prove the relation between minimal balanced collections on the one hand and minimal negative balanced collections and minimal subbalanced collections on the other hand. Theorems 4.3 and 4.5 show how the exact balanced weight vectors can be obtained from minimal balanced weight vectors. Note that the minimal balanced collections of every subset of the player set, which are needed to construct the minimal subbalanced collections, are constructed by the Peleg procedure in the process.
